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Introduction 
 
  The starting point for any analysis of the negotiating history of the NPT 
withdrawal provisions, Article X.1, is a comparison with the withdrawal article of the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Article IV, upon which it was based.  Article X.1. of the 
NPT states 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests.  
The shaded text above is Article IV of the PTBT. The unshaded text highlights the 
additional requirements added to the PTBT text by the architects of the NPT. It has to 
be assumed that these additional conditions were not added accidentally: rather they were 
included with specific purposes in mind. Moreover, their apparent effect was to impose 
additional restrictions on states contemplating to withdraw from the NPT from those 
specified for PTBT parties. 
 
The most exhaustive analysis of the NPT withdrawal clauses has been provided 
by Mohammed Shaker.  Additional material on Article X.2 and the general circumstances 
surrounding the negotiation of the withdrawal article has been provided by Bunn et al. In 
Shaker’s words, these additional provisions over the PTBT ‘provide an additional brake 
on hasty withdrawal action without limiting the basic right of withdrawal’.
1 
 
I. The Right to Withdraw 
  In legal relationships parties can arguably contest that what is not specifically 
prohibited by the treaty is therefore allowed.  This argument was used by the US 
administration in arguing to the US Senate that NATO nuclear sharing arrangements 
could continue under the NPT.  Similarly, the opposite interpretation may be equally 
credible: that unless expressly included, an act is not allowed.   
 
Although the NPT specifically describes a set of requirements for withdrawal, the 
omission of such a clause would not necessarily prohibit states from exercising their 
sovereign right to withdraw.  Indeed it can be argued that this right always exists and is 
paramount over treaty commitments whether specific withdrawal clauses existed or not. 
During the negotiation of the NPT text, the USSR argued that a detailed withdrawal 
clause was unnecessary as State Parties always have this sovereign right to withdraw from 
a treaty. However, they also expressed concern that the specific inclusion of a withdrawal 
article might be interpreted by some as negating the existence of this sovereign right, 
unless it was expressly included in that article.  
 
These USSR objections to the inclusion of any withdrawal article in the treaty 
appear in part to have been related to a belief that ‘any special termination and revision 
clauses would generally further the assumption that a treaty can be denounced only in the 
way provided, and not in any other way’.
2 A more modern interpretation of such clauses 
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in multilateral disarmament treaties, however, suggests that they ‘do not preclude the 
operation of other grounds for termination, in particular the principle inadimplendi non est 
adimplendum and the clausula rebus sic stantibus.’
3 These other grounds for treaty termination 
or legal withdrawal, outlined by the rules on treaty interpretation in the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties, can also be used to argue that suspension of 
membership in a disarmament treaty is an alternative way of seeking to pressure other 
states to fulfil disarmament objectives than the “extraordinary events” clause.
 4  
 
Article X.1.can be traced back to a US proposal.  The Americans defended their 
insistence on its specific inclusion as a necessary requirement to ensure Senate 
ratification. Quite why this should be so remains unclear. The text also appears to be a 
compromise between the US and USSR positions over this matter by including both the 
idea that withdrawal was conditional, but at the same time starting with the recognition 
of the existence of the unconditional right of a state to withdraw in exercising its national 
sovereignty.  
   
  Although the US and USSR were the co-chairmen of the ENDC throughout the 
NPT negotiations, and their interests are reflected in the final text, they also had to take 
into account the concerns of other key states if they were to persuade all potential 
proliferators to sign and ratify the treaty. These states included Italy and West Germany, 
were at the time were concerned with the possibility of NATO dissolving and also 
wanted to keep alive the option for an MLF. According to Bunn et al it was these states 
that the drafters had in mind particularly when crafting the extension clause (Article X.2) 
and the withdrawal clause (Article X.1). The main concerns of the Germans and the 
Italians were threefold: 
·  maintaining ‘the option for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a multilateral 
European institution’;  
·  avoiding any indefinite promise not to acquire nuclear weapons; and  
·  avoiding a treaty with an ‘unlimited duration without undertakings by the haves 
to disarm that might forever divide the world into haves and have-nots’.
5 
 
The analysis by Bunn et al provides further detail on the negotiations of the 
extension provision.  The U.S. and the USSR wished for an indefinite duration clause, 
but included the 25 year delay in deciding on the duration of the treaty to gain agreement 
by Italy and Germany. Similarly, Bunn et al indicate that ‘as a concession to Italian, 
German and other have-not concerns about promising to foreswear nuclear weapons for 
an unpredictable future when the haves were not at the same time promising to disarm, 
the draft contained both a withdrawal clause…and a provision for a conference to review 
the operation of the Treaty…but without power to limit the further duration of the 
Treaty except by formal treaty amendment.’
6  
 
II. Grounds for Withdrawal of the NPT 
  Shaker argues that the negotiations from 1965 onwards on the NPT’s withdrawal 
clause were related to those over the similar clause in the PTBT signed in late 1963.  The 
negotiations over withdrawal from the PTBT revolved around acts by third parties which 
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would be the only legitimate grounds for withdrawal.  In particular three grounds for 
withdrawal had been discussed in the PTBT context: 
·  any party not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty;  
·  nuclear explosions by a State not party to the treaty under circumstances which 
might jeopardize the withdrawing party’s national security; and  
·  the occurrence of nuclear explosions under circumstances in which it was  
impossible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such 
explosions, if conducted by a party to the treaty, would violate the treaty or, if 
not conducted by a party, might jeopardize the withdrawing party’s national 
security.
7  
 
In 1963 the USSR did not want to directly specify potential nuclear states, such as China, 
and thus the qualifying phase “related to the subject matter of this Treaty” appears to 
have been regarded by them as a means of covering actions by these states.  In 1967 the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco also included a not dissimilar provision (Article 28.4). The flexibility 
and adaptability of the wording ‘extraordinary events’ and ‘related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty’ appealed to the US and USSR as it enabled them to hint at these actions 
and actors without specifying them.  
 
According to Shaker, neither regarded it as ‘desirable’ to determine in advance 
‘the exact boundaries’ of the ‘extraordinary events’ ‘related to the subject matter of the 
Treaty’.
8 On the other hand, the wording of the NPT left judgements on the existence of 
the extraordinary events completely to the discretion of the withdrawing state. This had 
at least two effects.  One was that it allowed Germany, Italy and other potential 
proliferators to take the view that the end of NATO etc. would free them to withdraw 
from the treaty.  At the same time, it allowed a party to exercise the right of withdrawal 
in the event of the violation of the Treaty by a third party, rather than invoking the 
suspension or termination of the Treaty under the principles of treaty law.  
   
  During the NPT negotiations, even though there was a lack of clarity among the 
drafters of the Treaty on the definition of ‘extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty’, U.S. officials did give prominence to violation of, or non-
compliance with, the Treaty by other parties as qualifying grounds for withdrawal.
9 Other 
specific qualifying grounds mentioned by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk were the 
dissolution of NATO and the eruption or wars.
10  
 
NNWS were asked to contribute to the formulation of the withdrawal clause, and 
one of those which took a close interest in the issue of restrictions on the grounds for 
withdrawal was the UAR (i.e. Egypt). 
11  It argued that withdrawal should not be ‘a 
matter of absolute discretionary power but should depend on non-observance of the 
treaty arising from its non-application or violation by a contracting party, or from the 
fact that a third state is supplying NW to another’.
12 The connection between withdrawal 
and failure to fulfil obligations relating to disarmament was also discussed during the 
drafting negotiations. Burma, for example, suggested revising ‘the withdrawal clause to 
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8 Ibid 
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make failure to fulfil in good faith the provisions of the article on nuclear disarmament a 
basis for withdrawal’.
13  
 
The NNWS also argued that ‘if the intentions of the treaty to achieve cessation 
of the nuclear arms race and to obtain nuclear disarmament have in reality been blatantly 
disregarded, parties to the treaty may come to regard this as an extraordinary event 
jeopardizing their own supreme interests’.
14  In that context, Brazil and Nigeria made 
formal proposals for delimiting the grounds for withdrawal by making it clear that it was 
up to the state withdrawing to make the judgement of its necessity, not others. Brazil, for 
example, submitted amendments to Article VII of the draft of 24 August 1967 to 
indicate that   
  “… Each Party shall… have the right to withdraw… if it decides that there have 
   arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty  
  which may affect the supreme interest of its country… ”.15 
 
Nigeria attempted to introduce more details into Article VII of the identical treaty drafts 
of 24 August 1967 by specifying the following grounds for withdrawal: 
  “ (a) that the aims of the Treaty are being frustrated;  
     (b) that the failure by a State of group of States to adhere to the Treaty jeopardizes   
  the existing or potential balance of power in its area, thereby threatening its security;  
     (c) that any other extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
   Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”.
16 
 
Following Canadian criticism of the Nigerian proposal, mainly based on the rationale that 
there would be a delay in Treaty ratification if there was a perceived threat of non-
adherence of other states, Nigeria proposed amendments to Article X of the draft of 11 
March 1968 which indicated that ‘grounds for withdrawal were not only the 
“extraordinary events” but also other “important international developments” which 
“have jeopardized, or are likely to jeopardize, the national interests” of the country’.
17 
   
  These proposals and criticisms of the provisions for withdrawal during 
negotiations of the NPT formed the basis for Shaker’s assessment that ‘withdrawal from 
the NPT would be a highly controversial issue’.
18 According to him ‘it is hard to imagine 
that a decision to terminate… the NPT would be taken strictly on the basis of 
considerations affecting the subject matter of the Treaty itself. A decision to end such an 
agreement, it was argued, would require a far-reaching re-alignment of the country’s 
foreign policy stance.’ 
19  He therefore regarded the provisions of the withdrawal clause 
as being carefully and intentionally worded, as the issue was clearly a sensitive one and 
the exercise of this right by any state would clearly have major international implications.    
 
III. Procedures for Withdrawal from the NPT: 
  The following section briefly provides comments on the intentions and purposes 
of the stated procedures for withdrawal from the NPT found in Article X.1. There are 
four basic conditions that a State Party must fulfil to legally withdraw from the Treaty:  
·  it must give notice of withdrawal to all Parties to the NPT;  
                                                
13 Shaker, 1980, p.890 
14 Ibid 
15 Shaker, 1980, p.891 
16 Shaker, 1980, pp.891-2 
17 Shaker, 1980, p. 892 
18 Shaker, 1980, 893 
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·  it must give notice of withdrawal to the United Nations Security Council;  
·  it must provide a statement of the extraordinary events which the State Party 
considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests; and  
·  the withdrawal notice must be provided 90 days in advance of the effective 
withdrawal date.  
   
1. “give notice of withdrawal to all the Parties to the Treaty” 
  The requirement for a State Party to notify all Treaty Parties of its intention to 
withdraw was a provision lifted from the PTBT. According to Shaker, the Brazilian 
delegation objected to this requirement, claiming that State Parties should only have to 
provide such notice to the three Depositary Governments.
20 Reasoning for this objection 
is not provided by Shaker’s analysis but given Brazilian/ Argentine relations, it may have 
been driven by regional concerns, or just to place on the depositaries the task of 
notifying all parties, rather than the withdrawing state. 
 
2. “give notice of withdrawal to the UNSC” 
  The requirement for a State Party to notify the United Nations Security Council 
of its intention to withdraw was not inherited from the PTBT, and thus is a provision 
specific to the NPT. It was also objected to by the Brazilian delegation, who argued both 
that the issue was not one which was automatically a concern for the Security Council, 
and also that the Council would consist of states other than NPT parties, and these 
should have no role in decisions concerning the Treaty.  Shaker, however, argues for the 
provision on the grounds that the UNSC would be a suitable forum for such a notice as 
the withdrawal by a State Party was likely to be based on security considerations. He 
further notes that since the withdrawal might indicate ‘an imminent acquisition of NW 
by the withdrawing states’, UNSC resolution 255 concerning security guarantees might 
be relevant and thus justify UNSC action under Article 34 of the Charter
21.  
 
3. “make a statement of the extraordinary events which the withdrawing Party 
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests” 
  This provision was not inherited from the PTBT or any other contemporary 
arms control treaty, such as the Outer Space Treaty, and or the Tlatelolco Treaty.  Indeed 
the Romanian delegation submitted a formal amendment to Article VII of the drafts of 
24 August 1967 to delete any reference to such a statement.
22 Shaker’s analysis of the 
Rumanian position was that it felt that a notice of withdrawal to States Parties and the 
UNSC would suffice. It also argued that the ‘content of the notice came within the 
exclusive competence of the government of the state finding itself in such a situation’
23. 
   
  Critics of this provision often stress that ‘the judgement on whether 
extraordinary events have taken place belongs to the party, even though the process of 
auto-interpretation is tempered by the criterion of good faith’.
24 As Aust indicates, while 
the wording of the withdrawal provision (‘if it decides’) ‘gives a discretion to the 
withdrawing party’, the additional requirement to give a statement of extraordinary 
events requires the party to ‘have grounds for its decision’. 
25 This limiting clause may 
have been intended to prevent arbitrary withdrawal, and increases the responsibility of 
                                                
20 Shaker, 1980 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
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the withdrawing party to provide a statement “spelling out” the specific factors ‘related 
to the subject matter of this treaty’ which it considers a threat to its interests.  
 
This requirement in itself therefore arguably places a burden of proof on the 
withdrawing state to provide a credible case, increasing the transparency of “illegitimate” 
withdrawals. This condition also suggests that the withdrawal case will be reviewed and 
the UNSC and the international community will pass a judgement on it. The explicit 
requirement for a statement allows for a more rapid and detailed diplomatic response, as 
the omission of such a requirement would make one difficult except in general terms, 
and thus would make an illegitimate withdrawal more feasible. 
 
 
4. “withdrawal notice should be given three months in advance” 
  The condition that a withdrawal notice should be given three months in advance 
to the UNSC and the State Parties was one inherited from the established time limit from 
the PTBT. Shaker’s analysis does not indicate any notable objection to this condition.  
 
IV. Some Conclusions 
·  As Shaker says, the further provisions in the NPT over the PTBT ‘provide an 
additional brake on hasty withdrawal action without limiting the basic right of 
withdrawal’.   
·  The judgement of what constitutes extraordinary events is something for the 
withdrawing state itself to determine, though it also implies that the act cannot be 
an arbitrary one: it must be purposeful.   
·  In that context the UNSC has the right to review the grounds for withdrawal, 
and pass a judgement on them, though not to veto it.   
·  The terms of the treaty cannot prevent a state withdrawing, but it should do so in 
the manner prescribed by the Treaty.  If it does not, the legal and practical 
consequences remain uncertain, and presumably are at the discretion of the 
UNSC.  
·  It also seems that the scenarios under discussion at the time the Treaty was 
negotiated revolved around the withdrawal of states as a consequence of non-
compliance by states parties within the Treaty or acts by states outside the Treaty. 
There appears to have been little thought given to situations where a state within 
the Treaty was to withdraw in the absence of such events.    
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